Professional Responsibility and Ethics (LAW 747)
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Course Overview & MaterialsSyllabus - LAW 7475 Topics
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Topics1. Introduction & Background10 Topics
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1.01. Introduction
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1.02. This course and the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE)
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1.03. Professionalism is more than just understanding the rules
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1.03.01. Formal assistance resources
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1.03.02. Informal well-being resources
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1.04. A short history of the regulation of lawyers
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1.05. Sources of law for regulating professional conduct
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1.06. Readings
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1.06.01. Hints on the Professional Deportment of Lawyers, with Some Counsel to Law Students
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1.06.02. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
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1.01. Introduction
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2. Admission to the Practice of Law8 Topics
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2.01. Introduction
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2.02. Requirements: Legal Education
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2.03. Requirements: Acceptable “Character and Fitness”
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2.04. Requirements: Pass State Bar Examination
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2.05. Requirements: Other Obligations
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2.06. Ethical Obligations in Submitting/Supporting an Application [Rule 8.1]
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2.07. Reading: In re Nathan, 26 So. 3d 146 (La. 2010)
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2.08. Reading: In re Jarrett, 879 N.W.2d 116 (Wis. 2016)
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2.01. Introduction
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3. Introduction to the Standard and Process of Lawyer Discipline17 Topics
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3.01. Introduction
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3.02. Disciplinary Agency: Structure and Process
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3.03. Justification for Attorney Discipline
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3.04. Disciplinary Sanctions
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3.05. Conduct that Subjects a Lawyer to Discipline [Rule 8.4]
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3.05.01. Rule 8.4(a): Violating, attempting to violate Rules of Professional Conduct or violating through another
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3.05.02. Rule 8.4(b): Criminal Act that Reflects adversely on honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer
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3.05.03. Rule 8.4(c): Conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
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3.05.04. Rule 8.4(d): Conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice
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3.05.05. Rule 8.4(e): Stating/implying the ability to influence governmental agency/official
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3.05.06. Rule 8.4(f): Assist a judge or judicial office in conduct that violates CJC or other law
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3.05.07. Rule 8.4(g): Engaging in conduct the lawyer knows/reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination
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3.06. Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession [Rule 8.2]
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3.07. Where a lawyer is subject to discipline; Choice of Law [Rule 8.5]
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3.08. Duty to Report Misconduct of another Lawyer [Rule 8.3]
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3.09. Reading: Disciplinary Counsel v. Brockler, 48 N.E. 3d 557 (Ohio 2016)
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3.10. Reading: In Re Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239 (La. 2005)
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3.01. Introduction
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4. Malpractice21 Topics
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4.01. Introduction
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4.02. Malpractice
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4.02.01. Attorney-client relationship
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4.02.02. Duty
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4.02.03. Breach
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4.02.04. Causation
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4.02.05. Damages
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4.03. Defenses
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4.04. Malpractice Standard for Criminal Defendants
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4.05. Malpractice Liability to Non-Clients
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4.05.01. Prospective Clients
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4.05.02. Beneficiary of a Will
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4.05.03. Where Lawyer Assumes Duty on Behalf of Non-Client
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4.05.04. Lawyer Represents Trustee-Like Fiduciary in Breach of an Obligation to the Intended Beneficiary of Fiduciary
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4.06. Prospective Waiver of Malpractice Claim [Rule 1.8(h) (1)]
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4.07. Provision for Arbitration of Malpractice Claims
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4.08. Settling a Malpractice Claim [Rule 1.8(h)(2)]
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4.09. Inherent Power of Court to Sanction
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4.09.01. Civil Contempt
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4.09.02. Criminal Contempt
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4.10. Reading: Lanham v. Fleenor, 429 P.3d 1231 (Idaho 2018)
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4.01. Introduction
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5. Unauthorized Practice of Law16 Topics
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5.01. Introduction
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5.02. History of Unauthorized Practice of Law
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5.03. Justification for Unauthorized Practice of Law
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5.04. Criminal Restriction on Unauthorized Practice of Law
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5.05. Ethical Restriction on Unauthorized Practice of Law [Rule 5.5]
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5.05.01. Defining the Practice of Law and Prohibition on Continuous Presence [Rule 5.5(a) & (b)]
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5.05.02. Exceptions to the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Provision of Services on a Temporary Basis When Associating a Local Lawyer [Rule 5.5(c)(1)]
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5.05.03. Exceptions to the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Provision of Services on a Temporary Basis When Related to Pending or Contemplated Proceedings [Rule 5.5(c)(2)]
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5.05.04. Exceptions to the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Provision of Services on a Temporary Basis When Related to Pending or Potential Arbitration/Mediation [Rule 5.5(c)(3)]
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5.05.05. Exceptions to the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Provision of Services on a Temporary Basis in a Transactional matter [Rule 5.5(c)(4)]
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5.05.06. Exceptions to the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Provision of Services on a Regular Basis: In-house counsel [Rule 5.5(d)(1)]
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5.05.07. Exceptions to the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Provision of Services on a Regular Basis: When Authorized by Law [Rule 5.5(d)(2)]
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5.06. Judicial Definitions of Unauthorized Practice of Law
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5.07. Pro se Representation: Individuals and Corporations
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5.08. Reading: Darby v. MS State Bd. of Bar Admissions, 185 So. 2d 684 (Miss. 1966)
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5.09. Reading: Fifteenth Judicial District Unified Bar Ass'n v. Glasgow, 1999 WL 1128847 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)
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5.01. Introduction
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6. Duty to Work for No Compensation (Pro Bono)13 Topics
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6.01. Introduction
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6.02. Unmet Legal Needs
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6.03. Ethical Obligation to Provide Pro Bono
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6.03.01. Mandatory Pro Bono
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6.03.02. Voluntary Pro Bono [Rule 6.1]
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6.04. The Florida Case Study
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6.05. Representation Through Appointments [Rule 6.2]
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6.06. Limiting Scope of Representation [Rule 1.2(c)]
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6.06.01. Limited Scope Representation and Unbundled Legal Services
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6.06.02. Ghostwriting
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6.07. Reading: Jonathan R. Macey, "Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfort for the power or welfare for the rich?", 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1115 (1992)
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6.08. Reading: Mississippi Ethics Opinion 261
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6.09. Reading: In Re Fengling Liu, 664 F.3d 367 (2nd Cir. 2011)
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6.01. Introduction
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7. Decision to Undertake, Decline, and Withdraw from Representation; The Prospective Client15 Topics
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7.01. Introduction
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7.02. Duties Owed to A Prospective Client: Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 15(1)
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7.03. Ethical Obligations to Prospective Client [Rule 1.18]
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7.04. Participation in Pro Bono Legal Services [Rule 6.5]
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7.05. Accepting Representation
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7.06. Formation of an Attorney-Client Relationship
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7.06.01. Mutual Assent to Representation [Restatement § 14(1) (a)]
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7.06.02. Implied Attorney Client Relationship [Restatement § 14(1) (b)]
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7.07. Non-Engagement and Termination of Representation Letters
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7.08. Withdrawal From Representation [Rule 1.16]
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7.08.01. Mandatory Withdrawal
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7.08.02. Permissive Withdrawal
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7.09. Duty to Protect Client’s Interests Upon Termination [Rule 1.16(d)]
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7.10. Reading: TCV VI, L.P. V. Tradinscreen Inc., 2018 WL 1907212 (2018)
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7.11. Reading: Togstad v. Vesley, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980)
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7.01. Introduction
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8. Division of Decisional Authority Between Lawyer and Client7 Topics
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8.01. Introduction
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8.02. “Objectives” v. “means” [Rule 1.2(a)]
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8.03. Areas of Absolute Client Autonomy
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8.04. The Diminished Client [Rule 1.14]
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8.05. Reading: Linsk v. Linsk, 70 Cal. Rptr. 544 (Cal. 1969)
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8.06. Reading: Borena v. Yellow Cab Metro, Inc., 342 S.W.3d 506 (TN COA, 2010)
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8.07. Reading: Ethics Committee Advisory Opinion No. 2014/15/5
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8.01. Introduction
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9. Competence, Diligence, and Communication8 Topics
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9.01. Introduction
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9.02. Competence [Rule 1.1]
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9.02.01. Duty to Maintain Competence in Technology [Rule 1.1, Comment 8]
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9.03. Competence in the Criminal Context: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
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9.04. Diligence [Rule 1.3]
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9.05. Communication [Rule 1.4]
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9.06. Reading: A Lawyer's View of Being a Litigant, Robert S. Caine, Letter, New York Law Journal (May 16, 1994), at 2
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9.07. Reading: Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1980)
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9.01. Introduction
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10. Duty of Confidentiality: Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine18 Topics
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10.01. Introduction
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10.02. Attorney-Client Privilege
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10.02.01. Communication
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10.02.02. Made to a Privileged Person [Restatement § 70]
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10.02.02.01. Communication in the Organizational Context
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10.02.02.02. Communication Between Government Attorney and Public Official
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10.02.03. In Confidence [Restatement § 71]
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10.02.04. For the Purpose of Obtaining or Receiving Legal Assistance [Restatement § 72]
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10.03. Attorney-Client Privilege with Joint Clients [Restatement § 75]
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10.04. Attorney-Client Privilege and Common Interest Arrangement [Restatement § 76]
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10.05. Invoking the Attorney-Client Privilege
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10.06. Termination of the attorney-client privilege [Restatement §§ 78, 79, & 80]
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10.07. Exceptions to the Attorney-Client Privilege
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10.07.01. Crime-Fraud Exception [Restatement § 82]
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10.07.02. Dispute Concerning Deceased Client’s Disposition of Property
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10.08. Work Product Doctrine
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10.09. Reading: Purcell v. District Attorney for Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997)
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10.10. Reading: Upjohn Company v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)
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10.01. Introduction
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11. Duty of Confidentiality: Rule 1.6 and its exceptions22 Topics
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11.01. Introduction
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11.02. Defining the ethical obligation of confidentiality [Rule 1.6]
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11.03. Confidentiality and Technology
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11.03.01. Cybersecurity
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11.03.02. Social Media
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11.03.03. Metadata
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11.03.04. Cloud Computing
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11.03.05. Hard Drives/Copiers/Fax Machines
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11.04. Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Information
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11.05. Authorized Disclosures: Client Consent and Impliedly Authorized Disclosure
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11.06. Exceptions to the Duty of Confidentiality [Rule 1.6(b)]
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11.06.01. Prevent Reasonably Certain Death or Substantial Bodily Harm
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11.06.02. Prevent Client from Committing a Crime/Fraud That is Reasonably Certain to Result in Substantial Injury to the Financial Interests or Property of Another
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11.06.03. Prevent, Mitigate, or Rectify Substantial Injury to the Financial Interests or Property of Another that is Reasonably Certain to Result or has Resulted from the Client’s Commission of a Crime or Fraud
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11.06.04. To Secure Legal Advice About the Lawyer’s Compliance with Ethical Rules
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11.06.05. To Establish a Claim or Defense on Behalf of the Lawyer
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11.06.06. To Comply with Other Law or a Court Order
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11.06.07. To Detect and Resolve Conflicts of Interest Arising from the Lawyer’s Change of Employment
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11.07. Duration of the obligation of confidentiality
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11.08. Reading: In Re Skinner, 758 S.E.2d 788 (GA 2014)
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11.09. Reading: North Dakota Ethics Op. No. 95-11 (1995)
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11.10. Reading: McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2003)
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11.01. Introduction
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12. Advising Clients – Both Individual and Corporate12 Topics
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12.01. Introduction
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12.02. Prohibition on Advising a Client on How to Engage in Criminal or Fraudulent Conduct [Rule 1.2(d)]
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12.03. Lawyer as an Advisor [Rule 2.1]
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12.04. Lawyer as an Evaluator [Rule 2.3]
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12.05. Limitation on Advice: Obligation to Respect the Rights of Third Persons [Rule 4.4(a)]
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12.06. The Client in the Organizational Context [Rule 1.13]
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12.07. Misconduct by an Organizational Constituents -- Reporting Up and Out
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12.08. Reading: Advising A Civil Litigation Client About Social Media, Opinion 2014-5, July 17, 2015
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12.09. Reading: People v. Chappell, 927 P.2d 829 (CO. 1996)
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12.10. Reading: State Bar of Arizona Ethics Opinion 11-01, Scope of Representation (February 2011)
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12.11. Reading: In Re Neary, 84 N.E.3d 1194 (IN. 2017)
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12.12. Reading: Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261 (TX. COA 1991)
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12.01. Introduction
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13. Conflict of Interest: Concurrent Client Conflict19 Topics
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13.01. Introduction
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13.02. “Directly Adverse” Conflicts [Rule 1.7(a)]
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13.03. “Materially Limiting” Conflicts [Rule 1.7(b)]
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13.04. When Client Can Consent to Conflict
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13.04.01. Client Right to Revoke Consent
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13.05. Multiple Client Representation: Criminal Defendants
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13.06. Multiple Client Representation: Confidential Information
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13.07. Identifying a Current Versus Former Client
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13.08. Identifying the Client in the Organizational Context
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13.09. Identifying the Client in the Governmental Context
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13.10. “Hot Potato” Rule
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13.11. Advance Waiver of Future Conflicts
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13.12. Positional Conflicts
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13.13. Representing economic competitors
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13.14. Conflict When Lawyer Serves on Legal Services Organization [Rule 6.3] or as a Member of a Law Reform Organization [Rule 6.4]
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13.15. Reading: Grievance Committee of the Bar of Hartford County v. Rottner Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, 1964 203 A.2d 821
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13.16. Reading: Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee Opinion 2009-7 (July 2009)
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13.17. Reading: Florida Ethics Opinion 02-3 (JUNE 21, 2002)
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13.18. Reading: Banning Ranch Conservancy v. Superior Court, 193 Cal.App.4th 903 (2011)
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13.01. Introduction
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14. Conflict of Interest: Conflicts Between A Client and the Lawyer’s Personal Interest9 Topics
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14.01. Introduction
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14.02. Business Transactions With A Client [Rule 1.8(a)]
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14.03. Using Client Confidential Information [Rule 1.8(b)]
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14.04. Gifts From Clients [Rule 1.8(c)]
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14.05. Publication Rights [Rule 1.8(d)]
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14.06. Sexual Relations Between Lawyer and Client [Rule 1.8(j)]
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14.07. Reading: In Re Fisher, 202 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2009)
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14.08. Reading: Passante v. McWilliams, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 298 (4th Cir. 1997)
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14.09. Reading: In Re Devaneey, 870 A.2d 53 (D.C. CoA 2005)
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14.01. Introduction
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15. Conflict of Interest: Former Clients13 Topics
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15.01. Introduction
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15.02. Identifying a Current and Former Client
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15.03. Explaining the Difference Between Current and Former Client Conflicts
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15.04. “Same” Matters [Rule 1.9(a)]
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15.05. “Substantially related” matters [Rule 1.9(a)]
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15.06. Issues with lawyers changing firms [Rule 1.9(b); 1.10(a)(2); and 1.10(b)]
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15.06.01. Lawyer going adverse to client of former firm [Rule 1.9(b)]
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15.06.02. Removing conflict from lawyers changing firms: the screen [Rule 1.10(a)]
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15.06.03. When lawyer leaves firm: the conflicts the lawyer leaves behind: 1.10(b)
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15.07. Using or Revealing Former Client Confidences [Rule 1.9(c)]
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15.08. Non-Lawyers Changing Firms: Secretaries/Paralegals/Law Students
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15.09. Reading: Bowers v. The Opthalmology Group, 733 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2013)
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15.10. Reading: Watkins v. Trans Union, LLC, 869 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 2017)
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15.01. Introduction
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16. Communication Between Lawyers and Represented/ Unrepresented Persons7 Topics
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16.01. Introduction
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16.02. Contact with Represented Persons: “No Contact Rule” [Rule 4.2]
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16.03.01. Client-to-Client Contact
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16.03.02. Identifying who is “Represented” in the Organizational Context
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16.04. Contacting Unrepresented Persons [Rule 4.3]
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16.05. Reading: In Re Malofiy, 653 Fed. Appx. 148 (3d Cir. 2016)
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16.06. Reading: Wisconsin Professional Committee Ethics Opinion E-07-01 (July 1, 2007)
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16.01. Introduction
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17. Billing for Legal Services: Fees, Handling Client Property (Settlement Proceeds and Physical Evidence)19 Topics
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17.01. Introduction
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17.02. “Reasonableness” Standard [Rule 1.5]
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17.03. Prohibition on Sharing Fees with Non-Lawyers [Rule 5.4]
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17.04. Billing for Expenses
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17.05. Contingency Fee Agreements
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17.05.01. General Requirements
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17.05.02. Cases in which contingent fee are inappropriate
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17.06. Hourly Fee Agreements
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17.07. Nonrefundable Fees & Retainers
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17.08. Changing a Fee During the Course of Representation
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17.09. Safekeeping Client Property [Rule 1.15]
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17.10. Collecting a Fee
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17.10.01. Retaining Lien
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17.10.02. Charging Lien
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17.11. Sharing Attorney Fees with a Lawyer Outside the Firm [Rule 1.5(e)]
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17.12. Reading: In Re Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. 1996)
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17.13. Reading: Mississippi Bar v. Coleman, 849 So. 2d 867 (Miss. 2002)
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17.14. Reading: Brady v. Starke, 2017 WL 487012 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017)
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17.15. Reading: Matter of Taylor, 807 S.E.2d 699 (S.C. 2017)
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17.01. Introduction
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18. The Decision to File/Prosecute a Claim; Litigation & Negotiation Tactics14 Topics
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18.01. Introduction
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18.02. Duty to file Non-Frivolous Claims/Defenses [Rule 3.1]
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18.03. Frivolousness in the Criminal Context
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18.04. Duty to Expedite Litigation [Rule 3.2]
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18.05. ADR—Lawyers as Mediators/Arbitrators [Rule 2.4]
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18.06. Lawyer as Third Party Neutral: In Future Litigation [Rule 1.12]
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18.07. Lawyer as Witness [Rule 3.7]
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18.08. Litigation Tactics [Rule 3.4(e)]
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18.09. Actions that Compromise the Impartiality of Tribunal [Rule 3.5]
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18.10. Dealing with Inadvertently Disclosed Information [Rule 4.4(b)]
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18.11. Dealing with Intentionally Disclosed Information
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18.12. Dealing with third-parties; Candor in Negotiations [Rule 4.1]
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18.13. Ethics of Settlement Agreements
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18.14. Reading: Gilster v. Primebank, 747 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. CoA 2014)
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18.01. Introduction
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19. Lawyer’s Duties to the Tribunal10 Topics
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19.01. Introduction
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19.02. Duty to Disclose Adverse Facts [Rule 3.3(a)]
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19.03. Duty to Disclose Adverse Law [Rule 3.3(a)]
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19.04. Duty When Client or Witness Intends to Commit/has Committed Perjury [Rule 3.3(a) (3) & (c)]
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19.05. Duty in Ex Parte Proceedings [Rule 3.3(d)]
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19.06. Duty in Discovery [Rule 3.3(d)]
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19.07. Duty in Nonadjudicative Proceeding [Rule 3.9]
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19.08. False Statements Regarding Judges/Judicial Candidates [Rule 8.2]
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19.09. Reading: In The Matter of Filosa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 460 (S.D. NY 2013)
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19.10. Reading: State v. McDowell, 669 N.W.2d 204, aff’d 681 N.W.2d 500 (Wis. CoA 2003)
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19.01. Introduction
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20. Duties of a Prosecutor; Limits on Trial Publicity12 Topics
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20.01. Introduction
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20.02. Limits on charging behavior [Rule 3.8(a)]
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20.03. Obligation to Mirandize/give opportunity to procure counsel [Rule 3.8(b)]
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20.04. Duty not to seek waiver of important rights from unrepresented accused [Rule 3.8(c)]
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20.05. Duty to disclose exculpatory information [Rule 3.8(d)]
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20.06. Limitation on subpoenas to defense counsel [Rule 3.8(e)]
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20.07. Limitations on extrajudicial statements
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20.07.01. Constitutional concerns
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20.07.02. Limits on prosecutors [Rule 3.8(f)]
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20.07.03. General limitations [Rule 3.6]
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20.08. Obligations when prosecutor learns of innocence of convicted defendant [Rule 3.8(g) & (h)]
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20.09. Reading: Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548 (Md. 2003)
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20.01. Introduction
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21. Solicitation & Marketing: Constitutional & Ethical Issues18 Topics
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21.01. Introduction
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21.02. Constitutional Aspects of Advertising
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21.03. In-Person Solicitation [Rule 7.3]
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21.04. Direct Mail Solicitation [Rule 7.3]
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21.05. “Forced Speech”: Requiring Disclaimers
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21.06. False & Deceptive Prohibition [Rule 7.1]
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21.07. Use of Trade Names
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21.08. Regulation of Internet Activity
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21.09. Testimonials
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21.10. Advertisements: General Requirements [Rule 7.2]
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21.11. Prohibition on giving anything of value for recommending services [Rule 7.2(b)]
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21.12. Reciprocal Referral Agreements [Rule 7.2(b)(4)]
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21.12. The Challenge of New forms of Marketing/Advertising
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21.13.01. “Deal of the Day” or Groupon
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21.13.02. LinkedIn Profiles
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21.14. Social Media Issues
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21.15. Reading: Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
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21.16. Reading: Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)
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21.01. Introduction
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22. Law Firm Administration Issues8 Topics
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22.01. Introduction
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22.02. Supervisory Responsibilities of Partners [Rule 5.1]
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22.03. Responsibilities of Subordinate Lawyers [Rule 5.2]
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22.04. Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants [Rule 5.3]
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22.05. Sale of a Law Practice [Rule 1.17]
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22.06. Ensuring Professional Independence of Lawyers [Rule 5.4]
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22.07. Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services [Rule 5.7]
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22.08. Reading: Mississippi Ethics Opinion No. 258 (December 01, 2011)
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22.01. Introduction
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23. Judicial Ethics35 Topics
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23.01. Introduction
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23.02. Maintain the independence, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary in all situations
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23.03. Perform the duties of the judicial office impartially
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23.04. Avoid bias, prejudice and harassment in performing judicial duties
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23.05. Avoid improper external influences on judicial conduct
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23.06. Perform judicial functions competently and diligently
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23.07. Ensure that all parties have a right to be heard
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23.08. Maintain decorum and proper demeanor; communication with jurors
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23.09. Political activities of sitting judges
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23.10. Political Activities of Judicial Candidates for Elective Office
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23.11. Political Activity of Judges for Appointive Office
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23.12. Role of campaign committees in judicial campaign
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23.13. Judges who become candidates for non-judicial office
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23.14. Ex parte communications
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23.15. Disqualification
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23.15.01. General standard of disqualification (“impartiality might reasonably be questioned”)
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23.15.02. Situations where judge must disqualify
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23.16. Remittal of disqualification
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23.17. The “rule of necessity”
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23.18. Restrictions on “extrajudicial activities”
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23.18.01. General restrictions on extrajudicial activities
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23.18.02. Appearances before governmental bodies and consultation with government officials
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23.18.03. Testifying as a character witness
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23.18.04. Appointment to a governmental positions
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23.18.05. Use of non-public information
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23.18.06. Involvement with discriminatory organizations
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23.18.07. Participation in educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organizations and activities
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23.18.08. Appointments to fiduciary positions
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23.18.09. Service as an arbitrator or mediator
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23.18.10. Practice of law
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23.18.11. Financial, business and remunerative activities
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23.18.12. Compensation for extrajudicial activities
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23.18.13. Judge accepting gifts, loans, bequests, benefits, or other things of value
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23.18.14. Reimbursement of expenses and waivers of fee or charges
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23.19. Reading: Republican Party v. White, 122 S.Ct. 32528 (2002)
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23.01. Introduction
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Course Wrap-UpWhat Did We Learn?
3.09. Reading: Disciplinary Counsel v. Brockler, 48 N.E. 3d 557 (Ohio 2016)
Reading Guide
This case takes a view of prosecutor misconduct from a different perspective than the Rhielman case. What if the prosecutor is engaging in subterfuge to keep a murderer off the street? Should that conduct be viewed differently?
Issues:
– What Rules were Brockler accused of violating?
– What conduct was the basis of the claim of misconduct?
– What was Brockler’s argument that he did not act unethically?
– How is ABA Rule 8.4(c) and its comments different from the Ohio Rule?
– What sanction did the majority impose on Brockler?
– What was the concern of the dissent? Do you agree with the majority or the dissent?
Disciplinary Counsel v. Brockler
48 N.E. 3d 557 (Ohio 2016)
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
Respondent, Aaron James Brockler of Lakewood, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0078205, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2004. In an April 7, 2014 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Brockler with engaging in professional misconduct while he served as the assistant Cuyahoga County prosecutor assigned to a murder case. Specifically, relator alleged that while investigating the shooting death of Kenneth “Blue” Adams, Brockler created a fictitious Facebook account and used it to contact the alibi witnesses of Damon Dunn, who had been indicted for the murder. …
Misconduct
Before he was indicted, Dunn denied any involvement in Adams’s death and told Cleveland police that at the time of the murder, he was with his girlfriend, Sarah Mossor, and her friend Marquita Lewis. Brockler did not believe that Dunn’s alibi was true, but Mossor and Lewis refused to talk with him on numerous occasions when he identified himself as the assistant prosecutor assigned to the case.
As part of his investigation, Brockler listened to recordings of telephone calls that Dunn had made from the Cuyahoga County Jail. On the morning of December 14, 2012, he listened to a recording of a heated conversation in which Dunn and Mossor argued over Dunn’s fear that Mossor would not be a reliable witness and Mossor’s belief that Dunn had not been faithful to her. Mossor suspected that Dunn had had a romantic relationship with a woman named “Taisha” and indicated that if her suspicion was true, she would end her relationship with Dunn. Believing that Mossor’s relationship with Dunn was near a breaking point, Brockler saw an opportunity to exploit her feelings of distrust and get her to recant her support for Dunn.
Recalling a Facebook ruse he had used in a prior case, Brockler planned to create a fictitious Facebook identity to contact Mossor. He attempted to obtain assistance from several Cleveland police detectives and the chief investigator in the prosecutor’s office, but they were not available. Believing that time was of the essence, Brockler decided to proceed with the Facebook ruse on his own approximately one hour after he heard the recording of Mossor and Dunn’s conversation. He created a Facebook account using the pseudonym “Taisha Little,” a photograph of an African–American female that he downloaded from the Internet, and information that he gleaned from Dunn’s jailhouse telephone calls. He also added pictures, group affiliations, and “friends” he selected based on Dunn’s telephone calls and Facebook page.
Posing as Little, Brockler simultaneously contacted Mossor and Lewis in separate Facebook chats. He falsely represented that Little had been involved with Dunn, that she had an 18–month–old child with him, and that she needed him to be released from jail so that he could provide child support. He also discussed Dunn’s alibi as though it were false in an attempt to get Mossor and Lewis to admit that they were lying for Dunn (or would lie for him in the future) and to convince them to speak with the prosecutor.
After chatting for several hours, Brockler sensed that Mossor and Lewis were suspicious, so he shut down the chat and deleted the fictitious account. He testified that he printed copies of the chats and placed them in a file—with the intent to provide copies to defense counsel—before he deleted the account, but those copies were never found. He attended five pretrial conferences from January through April 2013 but did not disclose the circumstances or content of his conversations with Mossor or Lewis.
Brockler was scheduled to take an extended medical leave beginning April 16, 2013, and assistant prosecutor Kevin Filiatraut was assigned to handle the Dunn case in his absence. Brockler gave his file to Filiatraut, reviewed the case with him, and attended a pretrial conference with him. Brockler also disclosed that he might need to be a witness at trial because both Mossor and Lewis had told him they would not support Dunn’s alibi, although they were afraid to say so in court. Brockler did not disclose how he obtained that information.
On the second day of Brockler’s leave and less than one week before Dunn’s trial, a police detective gave Filiatraut several documents, including a transcript of Lewis’s chat with “Taisha Little” (obtained from Lewis) and Lewis’s written statement about the chat. Filiatraut immediately made the documents available to defense counsel and began to investigate Little.
Although Filiatraut quickly informed Brockler about this new information, Brockler waited nearly three weeks to disclose that he was “Taisha Little.” Upon learning of Brockler’s ruse, Filiatraut reported this information to his superiors. The prosecutor’s office withdrew from the case and the court appointed the attorney general to serve as a special prosecutor. Shortly after Brockler returned from his medical leave in June 2013, his employment was terminated.
***
Approximately one year after Brockler’s termination, Dunn was convicted of aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, and having weapons while under disability. The parties stipulated in January 2015 that his conviction was on appeal, but it has since been affirmed…
Brockler admitted that the Facebook ruse violated the plain language of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), but he urged the board to carve out an exception for “prosecutorial investigation deception.”
Noting that a comment to Prof.Cond.R. 8.4 already recognizes an exception for lawyers who supervise or advise nonlawyers about lawful covert investigative activities …, [and] the board refused to carve out a broader exception to the rule. See Prof.Cond.R. 8.4, Comment 2A. . . .[1]
Instead, the board found that Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) requires an assistant prosecutor to refrain from dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation when personally engaging in investigatory activity and that Brockler’s Facebook ruse therefore violated the rule.
Brockler argued that his conduct did not violate Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) as charged in the complaint because it encouraged witnesses to come forward and tell the truth. But the board found that his subterfuge prejudiced the administration of justice because it had the potential to induce false testimony, injected significant new issues into the case shortly before trial, and materially delayed the resolution of the case by requiring further investigation and the appointment of a special prosecutor. ….
Sanction
… Aaron James Brockler is suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, fully stayed on the conditions that he engage in no further misconduct and pay the costs of this proceeding. If he fails to comply with the conditions of the stay, the stay will be lifted, and he shall serve the full one-year suspension.
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting.
The preamble to the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, entitled “A Lawyer’s Responsibilities,” lays out broad obligations, recognizing that “a lawyer not only represents clients but has a special responsibility for the quality of justice” and that that responsibility extends “to practicing lawyers even when they are acting in a nonprofessional capacity.” Prof.Cond.R., Preamble [1], [3]. By imposing a marginal sanction—a fully stayed one-year suspension—on respondent, Aaron Brockler, the majority minimizes his significant ethical violations and does so based upon a myopic view of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The men and women who serve as prosecutors in this state are authorized to enforce the law and administer justice, one of the noblest pursuits an attorney can enjoy. Accordingly, they must meet or exceed the highest ethical standards imposed on our profession. Given the significant ethical violations Brockler committed, I cannot implicitly condone the imposition of a negligible sanction for his egregious misconduct.
The substantial evidence of wrongdoing and the aggravating factors in this case prove that Brockler committed significant violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Yet faced with Brockler’s glaring disdain for the ethical responsibilities this court imposes on all attorneys in this state, a majority of this court imposes only a one-year suspension, fully stayed.
In the past, our punishment for lawyers’ conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation has been significantly harsher. We indefinitely suspended an attorney who had lied to the disciplinary counsel’s investigator. … We imposed a one-year suspension, with six months stayed on conditions, on an attorney who had falsely advised that her client’s case was being settled. … We suspended a lawyer for six months for attempting to advance his client’s interests with evidence that the lawyer knowingly fabricated. …
The disciplined attorneys in those cases were ordered to serve actual suspensions, and none of them was a prosecutor. Instead, those cases all involved civil matters, in which the worst outcome risked by the lawyer’s deception was the loss of money by a party.
In contrast, the stakes in this case involved imprisonment for up to a life term. Brockler actively hindered the pursuit of justice in a criminal proceeding on multiple occasions, by lying to alibi witnesses in an effort to make them change their statements. He made every effort to hide his deceptive activities until they were uncovered, and then he refused to admit that his actions were wrong.
Failing to require Brockler to serve even a single day of his suspension does little to establish that this court will ensure the integrity of prosecutors and the ethical administration of justice. Indeed, none of the cases upon which the majority opinion relies to support a fully stayed suspension involves a lawyer lying in a criminal case to the detriment of a criminal defendant and, ultimately, to the detriment of the public’s faith in our courts and in justice.
The stakes in this case are significantly higher than those in the cases cited in the majority opinion. The courts are the bulwark of justice, and we must prove that government is trustworthy and working tirelessly but fairly, ethically, and honestly in support of justice. To do that, we must require the offices of Ohio’s prosecuting attorneys to strive for flawless obedience to the ethical rules governing all lawyers practicing in the state. …
I am cognizant of Brockler’s desire to serve the public and to do what is “right” by protecting society from dangerous criminal defendants, just as I am aware of the intensely difficult nature of such work, which often involves tragic circumstances, elicits visceral reactions, and presents great risks for both the accuser and the accused. … Although criminal cases “bring the responsibility and necessity” of zealous representation, a prosecuting attorney “is not endowed with a concomitant right to denigrate the court in discharging that responsibility.” [Disciplinary Counsel v. LoDico, 833 N.E. 2d 1235, 1241 (Ohio 2005).]
In light of the series of lies and misrepresentations here and the impact they have on the profession and our communities, I would indefinitely suspend Brockler’s license to practice law in this state.
CONCLUSION
Because I believe that the court’s sanction in this case is entirely incongruous with Brockler’s behavior, I cannot subscribe to it. For his ethical misdeeds, I would indefinitely suspend Brockler’s license to practice law in the state of Ohio. Accordingly, I dissent.
[1] [ed. – Ohio Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4, Comment 2A provides: Rule 8.4(c) “does not prohibit a lawyer from supervising or advising about lawful covert activity in the investigation of criminal activity or violations of constitutional or civil rights when authorized by law.”]